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THE MEANING OF "ARISING OUT OF"
EMPLOYMENT IN ILLINOIS WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW
JOHN DWIGHT INGRAM*
INTRODUCTION

Workers' compensation laws were designed to eliminate the
hassles and uncertainties of recovering for work-related injuries
under prior employers' liability laws.' Prior to the enactment of
workers' compensation laws, employees were forced to sue employers directly alleging negligence; employees had to prove their
employers were at fault.2 This placed a burden on the employee,
who may not have had adequate resources to pursue a lawsuit.3
Even if an injured employee could afford to sue, he4 may have
had to wait quite awhile before recovering, if he recovered at all.5
Today, with the benefit of workers' compensation laws, workers
who are injured "in the course of' and "arising out of" their employment are entitled to payment without legal formalities or
undue expense.6
The current workers' compensation laws provide income replacement and coverage of medical expenses for employees who
are injured on the job.7 If the injury satisfies the statutory requirements of "arising out of" employment and being "in the
course of" employment, the employee is awarded benefits regard-

* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, A.B. Harvard University,
1950; C.L.U. American College of Life Underwriters, 1957; J.D. The John Marshall
Law School, 1966. 1 acknowledge with thanks the excellent support of my very
capable Research Assistants, Alyson Ray and David Bradford. I also acknowledge
Ms. Ray's contributions to the text of this article.
1. WORKERS' COMP. BUS. MGMT. GUIDE (CCH) 100 (1993) [hereinafter 1993
Bus. MGMT. GUIDE]. Worker's compensation laws exist in every state, the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Id. at $ 130.
2. Id. at $ 100.
3. Id.
4. When the gender for a personal pronoun could be either male or female, I
use the masculine pronoun generically, due to habit and my masculine personal
orientation. By doing so I avoid the rather awkward "he or she" and the grammatically incorrect "they." I trust that female authors will balance the scale on the
other side.
5. 1993 Bus. MGMT. GUIDE, supra note 1, at $ 100.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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less of fault.' However, an employee who recovers under workers'
compensation is barred from suing the employer in tort; the
workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy for redress bf the work-related injury.9
This article will survey how Illinois courts interpret the statutory requirement that, for an injury to be compensable under
workers' compensation law, it must "arise out of' the injured
worker's employment. First, the statutory requirements of
workers' compensation laws will be discussed. Second, the five
tests courts have utilized for determining when an injury arises
out of the employment will be discussed. Third, the test Illinois
courts have used will be examined. This part will focus on how
Illinois courts apply the test to different situations in determining
if the employee is covered under workers' compensation. Fourth,
the manner in which Illinois courts may be liberalizing and
stretching Illinois' purported test to allow recovery in many more
situations will be discussed. I will conclude that, especially in the
cases of "peril of the street," Illinois is allowing recovery without
even giving effect to the words "arising out of' and going beyond
even the most liberal test of determining when an injury arises
out of the employment.
I.

STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

In order for an injury to be compensable under the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act, it must "arise out of' and "in the
course of" the injured workers' employment. ° "'[I]n the course of
the employment' refer[s] to the time, place and circumstances
under which the accident occurred."11 Thus, if an injury "occurs
within the period of employment at a place where the employee
may reasonably be in the performance of his duties, and while he
is fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incidental thereto," the injury occurred in the course of employment. 2 The time

8. Id.
9. Id. An employee may receive benefits from his employer when he suffers a
.personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." Id. at
q 130. These benefits may include loss of wages (generally one-half to two-thirds of

the average weekly wage), hospital and medical expenses and death benefits. Id.
One must be an employee to be covered by worker's compensation; independent
contractors are not eligible. Id. An employee may recover under worker's compensation without regard to fault. Id. In fact, the employee's contributory negligence
does not lessen his right to benefits. Id. The worker's compensation system is a
quid pro quo arrangement; "[iun exchange for the assured benefits, the employee
(and the employee's dependents) give up their right to sue the employer for damages for any injury covered by a workers' compensation act." Id.
10. 820 ILCS 305/2 (1994).
11. Chmelik v. Vana, 201 N.E.2d 434, 438 (Ill. 1964).
12. Id.
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and space requirement is construed liberally to include "a reasonable time before commencing and after concluding actual employment,"13 especially where the injury occurs on the employer's
premises while the worker is "going to or from his place of employment by a customary or permitted route....' 4
Since the statutory requirements are written in the conjunctive, the Illinois courts have properly held that each phrase must
be given a separate meaning.15 For an injury to "arise out of" the
employment, there must be a causal connection between the employment and the injury; that is, the cause must be some risk
connected with, or incidental to, the employment. The Illinois
Institute for Continuing Legal Education states that:
To come within the statute, the employee must prove that some act
or phase of the employment was a causative factor in the ensuing
injury. He need not prove it was the sole causative factor or even
that it was the principal causative factor but only that it was a
causative factor in the resulting injury. 6
This includes acts the employee was told to perform, acts incidental to his assigned duties and acts which he had a legal duty to
perform. It also includes risks to which the employee is exposed
which are different from, or greater than, the risks to which the
general public is exposed.17 Interpretation of the clause "arising
out of' has led to much litigation.
Also, "an employer takes its employees as it finds them, and
a preexisting condition does not bar compensation" 8 if the injury

13. Id.
14. M&M Parking Co. v. Industrial Comm., 302 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ill. 1973).
Many of these cases involve injuries incurred on parking lots maintained by employers for the use of employees. See, e.g., Chmelik, 201 N.E.2d at 434 and cases
cited therein.
15. Fire King Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm., 342 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ill. 1976).
16. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION PRACTICE (Ill. Inst. for CLE, 1994) at 319.

17. Komatsu Dresser Co. v. Industrial Comm., 601 N.E.2d 1339, 1344 (111. App.
Ct. 1992). If the cause of injury is unrelated to the employment or the workplace
environment, but rather is a hazard to which the worker would have been equally
exposed apart from his work, the injury does not "arise out of" the employment.
Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co., 578 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ill.
1991).
18. Komatsu, 601 N.E.2d at 1345. In Komatsu, a machinist had to lift parts
weighing 30 and 40 pounds from a box next to his machine. Id. at 1341. The box
was waist high and he had to bend from the waist to lift out a part. Id. One day
when he bent over to pick up a part from the box, he felt a sharp pain in his lower
back. Id. At the same time he sneezed, which caused the pain to spread throughout
his entire lower back. Id. He had a pre-existing back condition. Id.
The court held the injury "arose out of" his employment. Id. at 1345. The act
of bending aggravated his pre-existing condition. Id. In order to get parts from the
box he had to bend from the waist, but he could not bend his knees when doing so,
as one would ordinarily do. Id. Having to do this for eight hours a day was a greater risk than that of the general public. Id.

156
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satisfies the tests stated above for "arising out of." Only "if an
employee's health has so far deteriorated that any normal daily
activity is overexertion" will compensation be denied on the basis
of his preexisting condition. 19

II. TESTS USED TO DETERMINE ARISING OUT OF
Depending on which test a certain jurisdiction uses, an injury
may or may not be considered "arising out of' employment, and
thus may or may not be compensable under workers' compensation. The lines of interpretation of the 'arising' phrase can be
reduced to the five summarized below. The peculiar risk doctrine
and the proximate cause test are practically obsolete. However,
the increased-risk, actual-risk and positional risk doctrines are
widely used today. Taking a look at these doctrines helps to compare and contrast the views different jurisdictions take in determining whether an injury arises out of the employment. This is
especially true when a jurisdiction like Illinois purports to use one
test, and an examination of cases reveals that, at least in some
instances, it is really applying another test.
A. Proximate Cause Test
This test, used in some older workers' compensation cases, is
nearly obsolete now due to the fact the it requires foreseeability,
whereas workers' compensation laws permit recovery even if the
injury was not foreseeable.20 This test required that the harm be
foreseeable and that the chain of causation not be broken by an
independent intervening cause.2

19. Id. at 1345. In Hansel & Gretel Day Care Center v. Industrial Comm., a daycare worker attended a staff meeting, where she sat in a child's chair with her legs
under a children's table. 574 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). There were
higher chairs available at their meeting. Id. She sat in children's chairs every day
and had always gotten up successfully. Id. However, when she got up after the
meeting her knee locked and she later had surgery. Id. She had prior history of her
knee occasionally locking, and doctors testified that her knee could have locked
just from walking, turning, or getting out of bed. Id. So, compensation was denied.
Id. at 1251.
Similarly, in Hopkins v. Industrial Comm., a police sergeant who usually sat
in a swivel chair at the courthouse was sitting in a straightback chair. 553 N.E.2d
732, 732 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). When he turned in the chair to answer a question he
felt a "pop" in his back. Id. Doctors testified that the injury could have occurred
anywhere with any normal activity. Id.
20. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMENS' COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES

AND DEATH § 6.20 (1991).
21. Id.
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B. Peculiar-RiskDoctrine

The peculiar risk doctrine was the dominant rule for courts
at the time most workers' compensation laws were created.22 Under this doctrine, the injured employee had to show "that the
source of the harm was in its nature peculiar to his occupation."23 This test required that the nature of the source of the
harm, not its quantity, was peculiar to the occupation.24 "Accordingly, even if his work subjected him to a tremendously increased
quantitative risk of injury by heat, or cold, or lightning, the claimant might be turned away with the comment that 'everyone is
subject to the same weather.'"2" The peculiar risk doctrine is
rarely used anymore by courts, and has generally been replaced
by the increased-risk doctrine.
C. Increased-Risk Doctrine

The increased-risk doctrine is the most widely used test today. To satisfy this test, an injured employee must show that the
injury was caused by an increased risk to which he, as distinct
from the general public, was subjected due to his employment.2"
"This test differs from the peculiar-risk test in that the distinctiveness of the employment risk can be contributed by the increased quantity of a risk that is qualitatively not peculiar to the
employment."27 Illinois purports to use the increased-risk doctrine in interpreting "arising out of' employment.28
D. Actual-Risk Doctrine

Many courts have modified the increased-risk test and now
require only that the injured employee show that the risk was
actually a risk of his employment, even if the general public may
also be subjected to the risk.29 There is no real need to show a
peculiar or increased risk; the employee must show only that the
employment subjected him to the actual risk which injured
him. 30 It does not matter under this test that the risk was com22. Id. at § 6.6.
23. Id.
24. Id. at § 6.00.
25. LARSON, supra note 20, at § 6.20.
26. Id. at § 6.00.
27. Id. at § 6.30.
28. Campbell 66 Express, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n., 415 N.E.2d 1043, 1044
(1ll. 1980). "This State... adheres to the general requirement that one's employment must subject him to an increased risk beyond that to which the general pub-

lic is subjected." Id.
29. Larson, supra note 20, at § 6.00.
30. Id. at § 6.4.
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mon to the general public."' Thus, if there is a risk, an injury
stemming from it is compensable.32 Under this doctrine, claimants may recover for "act of God" situations or "peril of the
streets" situations.
E. PositionalRisk Doctrine
Unlike Illinois, some other states construe the "arising out of"
requirement much more liberally, and allow compensation in
situations where a court applying the stricter test would not.
These states sometimes apply the "positional risk" test, which is a
"but for" approach. Under the "positional risk" test, an injury is
compensable if it would not have happened "but for" the fact that
the conditions or obligations of the employment put the claimant
in the position where he was injured.34 This test is being espoused by a growing number of jurisdictions. In 1991, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that Illinois Workers' Compensation law
does not recognize the positional-risk doctrine, as it would be
inconsistent with the Workers' Compensation Act.35 However,
this test is being adopted by a growing number of states.3 6
An example of the positional risk test is found in Nippert v.
Shinn Farm Construction Company," where workers were erect-

31. WORKERS' COMP. BUS. MGMT. GUIDE (CCH) 'I 3435 (1994) [hereinafter 1994
Bus. MGMT. GUIDE].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Larson, supra note 20, at § 6.00.
35. Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co., 578 N.E.2d 921, 925-26 (Ill.
1991). The court stated that "[t]his court has previously declined to adopt the positional risk doctrine, believing that the doctrine would not be consistent with the
requirements expressed by the legislature in the [Workmens' Compensation]
Act .... [We continue to adhere to that view." Id. See also Campbell 66, 415
N.E.2d at 1044 (rejecting the positional risk doctrine). In Campbell, the court
stated that "[t]his state has not adopted the positional-risk theory, but adheres to
the general requirement that one's employment must subject him to an increased
risk beyond that to which the general public is subjected." Id.
However, I will show in this article that Illinois courts in some situations,
especially those involving perils of the street, do not rely on their traditional strict
increased-risk test, and, in fact, do apply a positional risk or "but for" test in determining whether an injury arises out of employment.
36. 1994 Bus. MGMT. GUIDE, supra note 31, at 1 3435. These states are allowing recovery in cases in which the nature of the work is irrelevant to the injury. Id.
37. 388 N.W.2d 820, 821 (Neb. 1986). See also Deffenbaugh Industries v. Angus,
832 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing workers' compensation benefits
for an employee who was injured when a tornado destroyed the employee's mobile
home that was located on the employer's premises; business operated 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, and he had to be available at all times to take calls from
truckers who would be arriving, and to help unload trucks; he was awaiting a
truck when tornado hit); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 455, 456
(Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (allowing workers' compensation recovery for a claimant in-
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ing a shed on a farm. One worker was injured when he was
thrown thirty feet by a tornado, whose path was one-half to oneand-one-half miles wide and travelled about fifty-eight miles.38
The court held that his injury "arose out of' his employment,
because his employment duties put him in a position where he
would not otherwise have been, which exposed him to a risk, even
though the risk was not greater than the risk to the general public.39 "But for" his employment, he would not have been there to
be injured.'
Some courts go even further in liberality. In Circle K Store
#1131 v. Industrial Commission of Arizona,"' an employee car-

ried trash to a dumpster at the end of her shift. As she turned
away from the dumpster, she turned her ankle and fell.42 While
the court referred to the fact that her employment put the employee in the place where the injury occurred, it really seemed to
hold that an injury "arises out of' if the employee is on the job
and performing duties for the employer, unless the cause of the
injury is purely personal to the employee.43 The effect of this
analysis is to simply eliminate the "arising out of' requirement.
According to the Circle K court, any injury which occurs "in the
course of' the employment will be deemed to "arise out of" the
employment unless its cause is personal."
The increased-risk test, the actual-risk test and the positional-risk test are the three general tests widely used by courts today. Illinois courts generally purport to use the strictest test, the
increased-risk test. However, as will be shown below, Illinois
courts seem to be following the lead of other jurisdictions who
construe the "arising out of' requirement much more liberally.
This is true despite the Illinois Supreme Court's statement in
Brady v. Louis Ruffolo 45 that Illinois rejects the positional-risk
test.4 6

jured when windstorm or tornado struck building in which he was working);
Whetro v. Awkerman, 174 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Mich. 1970) (allowing workers' compensation recovery in two cases: (1) when a caretaker-gardener was injured by the
collapse of the residence where he was working during a tornado; and (2) when a
salesman died as a tornado destroyed the motel where he was staying while on
business trip).
38. Nippert, 388 N.W.2d at 821.
39. Id. at 822.
40. Id.
41. 796 P.2d 893 (Ariz. 1990).
42. Id. at 894.
43. Id. at 898.

44. Id.
45. 578 N.E.2d 921, 925-26.
46. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale of
the Illinois Supreme Court in rejecting the positional risk test.
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III. ILLINOIS COURTS' APPLICATIONS OF THE "ARISING OUT OF"
TEST

This section will describe the various situations where courts
consider work-related injuries to "arise out of' employment. Thus,
recovery may depend on whether the injured worker was in the
performance of the duties of his job, whether the injury was created from a condition of the employer's premises, whether the risk
to the employee was greater than the risk to the general public
and whether the employee was exposed to a peril of the street
when he sustained injury. This section will show that, in some
situations, Illinois courts quite liberally construe the arising out of
requirement without even applying the liberal "but for" test. This
is especially true in cases involving "peril of the streets."
A. The Performance of the Duties of a Job
An injury "arises out of' the employment when the cause of
the injury is an activity related to the performance of the duties 4of7
a job. In Komatsu Dresser Company v. Industrial Commission,
a machinist's work required him to lift parts weighing thirty and
forty pounds from a box next to his machine." The top of the box
was waist high and he had to bend from the waist to lift out a
part.49 One day when he was bent over to pick up a part from
the box, which was three-fourths empty, he felt a sharp pain in
his lower back. 0 The court held that the injury "arose out of' his
employment."' He had to bend from the waist to get parts, but
couldn't
bend his knees when doing so, as one would ordinarily
52
do.

In Miller v. Reynolds,53 the plaintiff was a cook and housekeeper.54 Her employers, the homeowners, called an animal control officer to trap raccoons on the roof.55 The officer set and baited a trap, and plaintiff re-baited it several times that day and the
next. The fifth time she fell and was injured.56 Her employer (the
wife) knew she was baiting the trap. The injured woman sued her
employers for negligence.57 The appellate court held that her ac-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

601 N.E.2d 1339 (Il. App. Ct. 1992).
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1345.
Komatsu, 601 N.E.2d at 1345.
558 N.E.2d 673 (111. App. Ct. 1990).
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tion was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers'
compensation statute.5 8 Her injury would be compensable under
the Workers' Compensation Act, and therefore her employers were
immune from a common law suit.5 9
Plaintiffs employers testified that her job involved only indoor work -

cooking, cleaning, laundry, etc. -

and did not in-

volve climbing ladders.6 ° But the court said that her employers
knew she was tending to the trap, and made no objection. 61 They
acquiesced, and it was for their benefit.6 2 Therefore, climbing the
ladder was a duty of her job. 3
These cases may be contrasted with several recent cases in
which the court held that an injury did not "arise out of' because
it was not caused by the performance of job-related duties. In

Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Industrial Commission," the

employee sprained his ankle when he stepped off a curb while
walking from the plant to the parking lot at the end of his
shift.65 The court said that stepping off the curb was not part of
his job duties.66
Similarly, in Hopkins v. Industrial Commission,67 a police

sergeant was sitting in a chair at the courthouse. When he turned
in the chair to answer a question he felt a "pop" in his back.8
The court held that his injury did not "arise out of' his employment.6' Doctors had testified that the injury could have occurred
anywhere with any normal activity.70

58. Miller, 558 N.E.2d at 675. See 820 ILCS 305/5 (1994)
59. Miller, 558 N.E.2d at 677. Workers' compensation is based on a quid pro
quo; the employee gives up the right to sue the employer for injuries suffered at
work in exchange for receiving benefits without regard to fault. 1993 Bus. MGMT.
GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1 513. The Guide states:
If the injury is found to be related to the employment, it does not matter
who caused the injury, the employer or the employee; the employee is
awarded benefits. At the same time, benefits provided by workers' compensation are the employee's exclusive remedy for redress of his or her work-related injury.

Id.
60. The employers presumably had ample liability insurance and wanted to
help her collect the larger amount available in a common law action for elements
such as pain and suffering which are not covered by workers' compensation.
61. Miller, 558 N.E.2d at 676.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 541 N.E.2d 665 (Ill.
1989).
65. Id. at 666.

66. Id. at 669.
67.
68.
69.
70.

553 N.E.2d 732 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Id. at 733.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 734.
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B. Condition of Employer's Premises
An injury "arises out of" the employment when the cause of
the injury is a condition related to the employer's premises or the
work environment. In Scheffler Greenhouses, Inc. v. Industrial
Commission,7 a greenhouse owner permitted an employee who
rented a house on the greenhouse premises to build an aboveground swimming pool next to the greenhouse, and allowed employees to use the pool for relief from the hot, humid work environment.72 A worker took a swim during her lunch break and,
because the deck around the pool was narrow, she leaned back
against the roof of the greenhouse to sunbathe. 73 The glass roof
broke and she was injured. 74 The court held it could be found
that the injury "arose out of" the employment. 7' The employer
permitted use of the pool as a source of relief, and this was a
benefit to the employer and incidental to the employment.76 "[A]
causative factor of injury was the hot, humid work environment
which necessitated the use of the pool ... and thereby exposed
claimant to a risk to which she would not have been exposed
apart from her work environment."7 7
Another example can be found in Archer Daniels Midland
Company v. Industrial Commission,78 where an employee who
was walking from the plant parking lot to the plant slipped on ice
and fell.7' The court held that the injury "arose out of" the employment, because it was caused by a candition of the employer's premises."

71. 362 N.E.2d 325 (Ill. 1977).
72. Id. at 326.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 327.
76. Scheffler, 362 N.E.2d at 328.
77. Id. at 328. See also Union Starch, Division of Miles Laboratories, Inc. v.
Industrial Comm., 307 N.E.2d 118, 120 (Ill. 1974). An employee of a starch refinery
was injured when he walked on a shed roof to get fresh air and the roof gave way.
Id. Workers often went on roofs and fire escapes to get fresh air. Id. There was no
warning sign to stay off this particular roof. Id. The court held that the cause of
the injury was related to the employment environment and not to a hazard to
which he would have been equally exposed apart from his employment. Id. at 12122. The condition of the premises was a causative factor, and the employment did
increase the risk exposure. Id.
78. 437 N.E.2d 609 (Ill. 1982).
79. Id. at 610.
80. See All Steel, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 582 N.E.2d 240, 242 (1ll. App. Ct.
1991). On a cold day an employee went to the parking lot during his lunch break to
warm his car so it would start at the end of his shift. Id. at 241. The car caught
fire. Id. He ran into the employer's building and got a fire extinguisher. Id. On the
way back he slipped on melting snow on the floor and fell. Id. at 242. The court
said his going out to warm his car was a reasonable necessary act of personal comfort which occurred "in the course of" employment. Id. His employer clearly con-
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Two other examples can be found in Pechan v. DynaPro,
Inc. " and Beecher Wholesale Greenhouse, Inc. v. Industrial Commission. 2 In Pechan, an office manager sued her employer for
injuries caused by her exposure to second-hand smoke at work.
The court held that the statutory immunity of the employer applied, 83 as the injury "arose out of" her employment.84 Her employer knew of her sensitivity to second-hand smoke and allowed
employees to continue smoking near her.85 Her work thus caused
her exposure to this unhealthy environment - a condition of her
employer's premises. 6
In Beecher, a salesman for a wholesale greenhouse was
struck by lightning while talking with a customer on the tele87
phone during a rainstorm with much thunder and lightning.
An electrical engineer testified that the condition of the greenhouse telephone system increased the risk of electrical shock due
to lightning while using the phone: (1) high humidity and high
dirt content in the greenhouse increased conductivity along the
surface of the telephone line; (2) the telephone was situated at a
high point in the building and thus served as a target for lightning; (3) the telephone was not well grounded, which tended to
induce currents in the phone wire.8
8

C. Greater Risk Than General Public
An injury "arises out of" the employment when the cause of
the injury is a risk to which the employee is exposed because of
his employment, and his exposure to the risk is greater than that
of the general public. A good example of this can be found in
Holthaus v. Industrial Commission.89 A swimming pool manager
was preparing the pool for its June opening.90 At 6:00 p.m. she
was working alone in the pool, and her car was the only car in the

templated that employees would do this to facilitate their departure at the end of
the workday. Id. The cause of the injury was not the fire. Id. at 242-43. It resulted
from the fall due to snow on the floor of the building, i.e., a condition of the
employer's premises. Id.
Contrast All Steel and Archer Daniels with Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm., 541 N.E.2d 665, 666 (Ill. 1989), where an employee sprained his ankle
when he stepped off a curb while walking from the plant to the parking lot. There
was nothing unusual or dangerous about the curb. Id. at 669-70.
81. 622 N.E.2d 108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
82. 524 N.E.2d 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
83. Pechan, 524 N.E.2d at 751.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Beecher, 524 N.E.2d at 751.
88. Id. at 752.
89. 469 N.E.2d 237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
90. Id. at 238.
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pool parking lot. An escaped convict came by and asked if it was
her car in the lot.91 He then tried to get her keys, she resisted,
he shot her, and he escaped. 92 The court held that her injury
"arose out of' her employment, as her work site created an enhanced risk of a criminal assault.93 The pool area was isolated in
early May; the convict found a lone woman who had a car, and
was relatively isolated from anyone who might hear and help
her.94
Yet in another case with quite similar facts, Greene v. Industrial Commission," the court held that the injury did not "arise
out of" 9" An Orkin service technician was brutally stabbed and
killed in the Orkin parking lot in the early morning, near his
loaded truck.97 Nothing was taken from him or the truck.9" The
court said that the hazard was one to which he was equally exposed apart from his employment.99 However, his wife had
dropped him at the Orkin parking lot at 4:30 a.m., and his body
was discovered at 7:30 a.m. by the service manager."° ° So this
appears to have been an isolated area with a high risk of
crime. 10
A more readily understandable difference in result can be
found by comparing the cases of Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
Medical Center v. Industrial Commission °2 and Heath v. Jewel
Companies.1 3 In Rush-Presbyterian, a dietary supervisor took
an elevator from the seventh floor to the basement at 7:30 p.m. to
get to the kitchen.' She was grabbed by two men, taken to a
nearby stairway, and raped.' ° The court held that her risk was
greater than the risk to the general public.' 6 A psychiatrist had
testified that nurses are more prone to sexual assault because
they symbolize a strong maternal element to men with an Oedipal
complex.' 7 She was wearing a white uniform, was in an area

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 239-40.
94. Holthaus, 469 N.E.2d at 240.
95. 428 N.E.2d 476 (Ill. 1981).
96. Id. at 478.
97. Id. at 477.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 477.
100. Id. at 477.
101. Id. at 476-77.
102. 630 N.E.2d 1175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
103. 628 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
104. Rush-Presbyterian,630 N.E.2d at 1176-77.
105. Id. at 1177.
106. Id. at 1179.
107. Id. An Oedipal complex is a desire to achieve sexual union with a mother
figure.
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mostly frequented by staff, and her attackers expressed0 8disappointment when they discovered that she was not a nurse.
In Heath, a stock clerk was unloading a late delivery after
the store closed." °9 The door to the back room opened, and he
was shot in the head." 0 He did not recognize the person who
shot him."' There was no evidence that it was a dangerous
neighborhood; there was no robbery; and no one else was
hurt."' The court held that the Industrial Commission's finding
was not
that the injury did not "arise out of' the employment
3
against the manifest weight of the evidence.1
D. Peril of the Street
Many cases involve an injury which occurs during travel on foot, by bicycle, in a car, truck, bus, train, or plane. It is often
found that the injured employee was exposed to a risk greater
than the risk to the general public, as in Campbell "66" Express,
Inc. v. Industrial Commission."4 The driver of a tractor-trailer
from Springfield to Chicago was injured when a tornado threw his
vehicle 100 feet." 5 The court said it could be found that he had
some kind of time schedule, however flexible, so he did not have
the same freedom of choice as to whether to travel in bad weather

108. For two similar cases, see County of Cook v. Industrial Commission, 520
N.E.2d 896, 897 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (allowing workers' compensation recovery when
judge's secretary was stabbed and robbed while eating lunch in the courthouse
parking lot, used mostly by municipal employees but also sometimes by members
of the public; there was no lunchroom in courthouse, and her office was crowded
and shared; court held her injury "arose out of" her employment, as she was exposed to the increased risk of being victimized; public rarely used the lot; there
were many criminal defendants on the premises at noontime, especially that day),
and Chicago Housing Authority v. Industrial Comm., 609 N.E.2d 798, 799 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993) (affirming workers' compensation recovery when CHA carpenter was doing repair work in a public housing project early in the afternoon; he went to his
car in an adjacent parking lot to get more tools; some adolescents behind a car hit
him behind the head). The court held it could be found that place of attack presented greater risk of criminal assault. Id. at 801.
109. Heath, 628 N.E.2d at 336.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. An even clearer example of an injury held to not "arise out of'employment
can be found in Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co., 578 N.E.2d 921
(Ill. 1991). An engineer was working at a drafting table 47 feet from the edge of a
highway. Id. at 922. A truck carrying a load of gravel was hit by a car on the icy
road, 350 feet from the building. Id. The truck's steering wheel locked, and the
truck struck the building, causing injury to the engineer. Id. The court said the
location of the work site did not create any greater risk than the risk to other people along the same highway. Id. at 924.
114. 415 N.E.2d 1043 (Ill. 1980).
115. Id. at 1044.
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as an ordinary person would have." 6 Thus, he was subjected to
a greater risk of injury from a tornado." 7
Often called the "peril (or hazard) of the street" doctrine, the
theory is that:
where employees, in the performance of their work, are exposed to
the hazards of the street and to the hazards of automobile and railroad [and other forms of] transportation more than the general
public, such risks become risks of the employment, and... injuries
[that result from] such risks 'arise out of such employment." 8
In several cases courts found that an employee was exposed to
greater risk while driving in his employer's parking lot just before
or after work. For example, in Chmelik v. Vena,"' the plaintiff
was walking across his employer's parking lot to his car after
work. 20 He was struck by the car of another employee who was
also leaving work.' 2 ' The court held that the injury "arose out
of" employment. 22 There was greater risk than the risk to the
general public, at quitting time, "when there is a mass and speedy
exodus of the vehicles on the lot ..

,23

Yet several cases strongly indicate that an injury can be held
to "arise out of" the employment so long as the employment exposed the employee to the "peril of the street," even though the
risk which caused injury was exactly the same as and no greater
than the risk to which the general public was exposed. An early
example of this can be found in G.A. Dunham Company v. Indus-

trial Commission."" A heating engineer was asked by his employer to fly to Seattle on company business. 12 A bomb exploded
and all passengers were killed in the crash. 2 ' The court held

116. Id. at 1045.
117. Id.
118. G.A. Dunham Co. v. Industrial Comm., 156 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ill. 1959).
119. 201 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ili. 1964).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 438.
123. Id. at 439. See Hammel v. Industrial Comm., 626 N.E.2d 234, 235 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993. In Hammel the court allowed a workers' compensation recovery when, as
the employee neared the exit to her employer's parking lot, the employee's car was
struck by large truck en route to employer's scale. Id. The court said that configuration of the parking lot required trucks to cross employee traffic to reach designated areas of premises and, thus, created a hazard to which general public was
not exposed. Id. at 236. See also Sangster v. Keller, 589 N.E.2d 940, 941 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (allowing workers' compensation recovery when two employees were both
driving out of employer's parking lot after work when collision occurred). The
Sangster court said the use of the driveway by employees, especially at starting
and quitting times, resulted in increased risk of harm. Id. at 942.
124. 156 N.E.2d 560, 561 (Ill. 1959).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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that this was a risk of the employment, and the employee's death
"arose out of" the employment despite the fact that the engineer's
exposure to an aircraft bombing was exactly the same as that of
every other passenger.'27 There was not even any evidence that
he was a frequent flyer and thus more frequently exposed to such
danger. 2 '
The court in Torbech v. Industrial Commission"29 took a similar approach. A store employee was to work from 2:00 or 3:00
p.m. until 9:00 p.m. 30 The store owner suggested that the employee get food from a restaurant across the street and bring it back
to eat in the store, as she was the only one there when the owner
left. "' She was hit by a car while crossing the street. 3 2 The
court held that her injury "arose out of' her employment as she
was in the street because of the demands of her employment. 3
Here again, her exposure to risk was identical to that of any
member of the general public.'.
An extreme example of the "peril of the street" test can be
found in City of Springfield v. Industrial Commission."' A detective had gone home for lunch and was returning to the station
in an unmarked police car when his car was hit by another
car.' The majority of the court said that since he was "on call"
and had his radio on as required, his employer had authority over
him at the time and, thus, he was "in the course of" his
employment. 7 That being the case, his injury 38 was compensable, since it was caused by a "peril of the street."
Application of the "peril of the street" test has the effect of
eliminating the "arising out of" test for injuries incurred by employees while travelling "in the course of" their employment. As
Justice Stouder pointed out in his dissent in City of Springfield, ' 9 the detective's injury was not caused by the perfor-

127. Id. at 566.
128. Id.
129. 276 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 1971).
130. Id. at 344.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 345.
134. Torbech, 276 N.E.2d at 345. But see Lynch Special Services v. Industrial
Comm., where a warehouse security guard went to a restaurant one-and-one-half
blocks away during work hours to get coffee and donut. 389 N.E.2d 1146, 1146 (Ill.
1979). On the way back he slipped and fell on the icy sidewalk. Id. at 1147. The
court said the injury didn't "arise out of"; the icy sidewalk was not a hazard peculiar to his employment. Id.
135. 614 N.E.2d 478 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
136. Id. at 479.
137. Id. at 480.
138. Id.
139. City of Springfield, 614 N.E.2d at 481-82 (Stouder, J., dissenting).
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mance of any duties of his job, nor by a risk to which he was exposed more than the general public. 4 ° He was not assigned to
patrol duty; he was not responding to an emergency call or on his
way to a crime scene or investigation.' His travel was no different than anyone returning to work. He was exposed to no
greater risk than the general public. He was not conducting any
police-related activity; he was just driving. Justice Stouder argued
in his dissent that:
Under the majority's rationale, [he'd be covered if he] slipped and
[fell] in the shower while listening to his police radio .... Workers'

compensation is not a general... health and accident insurance
policy [, and t]he facts in this case should not be construed in such
a way as to make it so. 142

IV. THE EFFECT OF THESE CASES ON THE FATE OF THE
INCREASED-RISK DOCTRINE IN ILLINOIS

Illinois purports to apply a strict and traditional test for the
statutory requirement that, to be compensable, an injury must
"arise out of" the employment. In most cases the courts have indeed applied a strict and traditional test. An exception can be
found in cases involving travel while in the course of employment,
where the employee is exposed to the "peril of the street." In these
cases, the courts often apply, at most, a "but for" test," and at
times do not even discuss "arising out of" so long as the injury
was "in the course of."
In at least one case, the Illinois Supreme Court has allowed a
workers' compensation claim where the cause of injury would not
even satisfy a "but for" test for "arising out of." In Eagle Discount
Supermarket v. Industrial Commission,'" claimant broke his

ankle while playing frisbee during an unpaid lunch break on the
employer's parking lot.'4 5 The court applied the usual rule that
activities on the employer's premises during a lunch break are "in
the course of." 46 There the analysis ended; there was no discussion of the "arising out of" requirement except the court's statement that it was irrelevant that "the injury was not actually
caused by a hazard of the employment." 47

140. Id. at 481.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. The "but for" test states that "but for" the job requirements the employee
would not have been at the place of injury. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of the "but for" test.
144. 412 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. 1980).
145. Id. at 494.
146. Eagle Discount Supermarket, 412 N.E.2d at 496.
147. Id. On September 15, 1980, subsequent to the injury in Eagle Discount Su-
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If the approach of Eagle Discount Supermarkets was followed,
it would effectively eliminate the "arising out of" requirement.
That would violate the canon of statutory construction that each
word and phrase in a statute should be presumed to have some
meaning 1 8 Since "arising out of" and "in the course of" are stated in the conjunctive in the statute, each should be presumed to
have a separate meaning; they should not be treated as synonymous, and neither should be deemed superfluous.
CONCLUSION

Before an injured employee may recover under the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act, he must show that he was in the
course of employment when the injury occurred and that the injury "arises out of" the employment. Of the five general tests for
determining whether an injury arises out of employment, Illinois
courts purport to use the strict increased-risk doctrine. However,
Illinois courts, like other jurisdictions, have been much more liberal in interpreting "arising out of," especially in the case of perils of
the street. Although Illinois courts have said the courts must give
meaning to each of the words in a statute, they seem to be contradicting themselves by allowing recovery in some cases without
even analyzing the case under the most liberal "but for" approach.

permarket, the Workers' Compensation Act was amended to eliminate coverage for
"injuries incurred while participating in voluntary recreational programs...." ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.11. (Smith-Hurd 1983).
148. Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of
Chicago, 447 N.E.2d 394, 397 (Ill. 1983). "The words in a statute are to be given
their ordinary and popularly understood meaning." Id.

